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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
a further action for alimony.7 If the right is a separate "personal right" then a
court would have no jurisdiction to rule upon it in the absence of personal
service on the party to whom the "right" belongs.8
New York statutory provisions deem it a personal right. The constitution-
ality of such a statute hinges upon the interpretation given by the Supreme Court
to the so-called doctrine of "divisible divorce" in Estin v. ,Estin.1° If the.Estin
decision was based upon the rationale that a separation order secured prior to
-the divorce vests a personal right in the wife to alimony, the question as to the
extent of the "divisible divorce" doctrine has been left open. However, it would
seem, in view of Armstrong v. Armstrong," that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the broad interpretation favored by the majority in the instant case. A final
determination may be forthcoming in view of the fact that certiorari has been
granted in the Vanderbilt case.'
2
The dissent, in taking the narrow view, has expressed a fear that New York
will become a haven for non-resident wives who have had ex parte divorce decrees
taken against them. The majority, it may be noted, took special cognizance of the
fact that the plaintiff had entered New York prior to the divorce with the intent
to set up a domicile, thus indicating a restrictive application of the section in
question.
Reciprocal Support Statutes
The New York Uniform Support of Dependents Law13 provides a method
for a non-resident wife -or child to enforce the father's duty to support his wife
7. See Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E. 2d 423 (1943) and .rkenbrach
v. Erkenbrach, 96 N. Y. 456 (1884). Prior to section 1170-b a valid divorce
decree was a bar to a subsequent action f6r alimony; the right to support was
not in and of itself a basis for a cause of action. But see Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y.
193, 97 N. E. 2d 748 (1951), cert. den., 342 U. S. 849 (1951) in which the sever-
ability of the right to support was alluded to. In the Lynn case the Nevada court
had had personal jurisdiction over the wife and therefore the precise question
involved here was not decided.
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877). Personal service is required as a
basis for a personal judgment.
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947), aff'd, 334 U. S. 541 (1948). The
case indicated that each state has the power to make its own-provisions as to the
survival of the right to support but that, at least in the situation where a prior
separation agreement has been obtained, an ex parte decree may not affect it.
11. 350 U. S. 568 (1955). The majority took the view that the Florida court
had intended to leave the question open despite the specific denial of alimony
rendered by that court. Though the Court thus avoided the constitutional. question
it is an indication that its attitude, is one of agreement -with the personal right
doctrine. The concurring justices felt that the. constitutional question had to be
decided and argued in conformance wih -the instant opinion. See also Hopson v.
Hopson, 221 F. 2d 839 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
12. See note 2 supra.
13. McK. UNCONSOL, LAWS §§2111-2120. .
189
BUPIALO LAW RBVIEV
and minor children where personal jurisdiction over the father cannot be obtained
without the expense and delay of a journey to New York. Under the Act the
claimant may initiate a proceeding demanding support in the state of her residence
or domicile.14 A transcript of the proceedings' including claimant's petition is
forwarded to New York where a hearing is held.15 If defendant controverts or
denies a material allegation of the petition, the New York proceedings will be
stayed and a transcript forwarded to the court wherein claimant initiated pro-
ceedings. 10 Her testimony and evidence is then forwarded to New York where the
hearing is resumed. 17 Briefly, the initiating court becomes an adjunct to the New
York court for the purpose of taking claimant's testimony and evidence.
In Landes v. Landes,'8 the constitutionality of this Act was before the Court
of Appeals for the first time. Claimant had initiated proceedings against respond-
ent in California for the support of their minor child and the transcript had been
forwarded to New York for determination and enforcement. Respondent attacked
the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds, inter alia, that it denies the safe-
guards accorded an individual when prosecuted for a crime, to wit, the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him'0 and that a proceeding of
this sort is quasi-criminal in nature. The Court held, affirming the Appellate
Division,- that the Act, at least insofar as it reciprocally enforces support of a
minor child, is constitutional.
Without a doubt a father is primarily liable for the support of his minor
children despite lack of custody and despite the residence of the child elsewhere.2'
Further, it cannot be denied that the welfare of the child is of prime importance
14. Id. §2116 (a).
15. Id. §2116 (c).
16. Id. §2116 (f).
17. Id. §2116 (g), (h).
18. 1 N. Y. 2d 358, 135 N. E. 2d 562 (1956), appeal docketed, 25 U. S. L. WEEK
3155, (U. S. Oct. 12, 1956) (No. 507). Respondent's appear to the Supreme Court
is on the grounds that the Act is in violation of U. S. CONsT. art. I, §10, cl. 3 In
that it is an agreement between the States without the consent of Congress and
further that it denies equal protection of the laws in violation of U. S. CONSr.
art. IV. §2, cl. 1. It is submitted that the decision is sound and will be affirmed.
The agreements or compacts between the States which the Constitution has
reference to are those which interfere with the supremacy of the United States.
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1892). The Act in question is hardly such a
threat. See Duncan v. Smith, - Ky. -, 262 S. W. 2d 373 (1953) for an Inter-
esting theory that such laws do not even constitute agreements. As evidenced by
In re Cattalini, 72 Cal. App. 2d 662, 165 P. 2d 250 (1920), the California law with
regard to a father's liability for the support of his minor children is substantially
the same in effect as the New York law. Therefore there can be no question but
that such laws afford equal protection. Similar acts have been held constitutional
in Mahan. v. Reed, 240 N. C. 641, 83 S. E. 2d 706 (1954); Pennsylvania v. Warren,
204 Md. 467, 105 A.; 2d 488; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P. 2d 613
(1954).
19. U. S. CONST. amend. VI; N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, §6.
20. 1 A. D. 2d 772, 149 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (1956).
21. Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237 N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219 (1924).
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both from the standpoint of the child itself and the interest which the state has
by virtue of its social welfare laws. The only remaining question is whether the
New York procedure of enforcing this duty in the situation contemplated by
the Act denies due process to a prospective respondent.
Due process, of course, does not guarantee any particular type of procedure
in the state system but it does require that the procedures which are employed
be fair.2 2 The patent necessity of cross-examination to a fair hearing has been
emphasized by many writers.2 3 It would be impossible for a court sitting in New
York to determine the credibility of a complainant or witness in California unless
there is direct evidence contradicting the testimony thus obtained.
It is submitted by the writer that, although the decision upon this point is
correct, the grounds set forth by the Court, that this is a civil suit and not a
criminal action, are somewhat weak. The Act is directed toward the errant father
and is a means of overcoming his ability to use lack of jurisdiction as a shield
against this responsibility. The respondent may always submit himself to the juris-
diction of the initiating court in order to confront the complainant and her
witnesses.2 4 The respondent has a choice, albeit an expensive one, in the instant
situation. It would seem that better social policy would dictate that the expense
of travel should be placed upon the one who has shirked his duty than upon the
one to whom the duty is owing. Due process has not been denied-it merely
has been used as a bargaining tool.
Foreign Custody Decrees
In Bachman v. Mejias25 the controversial26 question of custody of children
was again before the Court of Appeals. Respondent had taken her child to New
York in defiance of an order of a Puerto Rico Court which had previously given
custody to the child's grandparents. The prior decree had provided for readjudica-
tion after a hearing. Evidence tended to show that the child's social development
was retarded as a result of his separation from his mother, brother and sister.
Petitioner commenced habeas corpus proceedings in New York for the return of
the child.27 The Court held, reversing the Appellate Division,2s that the writ
was properly denied.
22. Dolany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362 (1930).
23. See, e.g., 5 WGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367 (3d ed. 1940); Stryker, Cross-
Examination, 2 BUFFALO L. REV. 45 (1952).
24. McK. UNCONSOL. LAWs §2118; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270
P. 2d 613 (1954). The Smith case presents an excellent resume of the purposes and
procedures of reciprocal support laws.
25. 1 N. Y. 2d 575, 136 N. E. 2d 866 (1956).
26. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Micar. L.
REV. 345 (1953).
27. People ex rel. Pruyne v. Walts, 122 N. Y. 238, 25 N. E. 266 (1890).
28. 1 A. D. 2d 319, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 48 (2d Dep't 1956).
